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Abstract 
This paper provides a framework to understand why a country might resort to a policy like an import ban when at risk 
from infectious disease outbreak overseas. Superior import-competing domestic production technologies, and over-
reliance on taxing the public for government revenue, could lead to blocked trade. The results of the two-country 
political economy model lend support to the wide use of public health interventions to minimize infections, and 
highlight their role in promoting open trade policies.
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1. Introduction 
 
Global commerce has been threatened quite regularly over the past couple of decades by 
frequent outbreaks and spread of infectious diseases. This has prompted many countries to 
respond by putting strict restrictions on imports from affected countries, often to the detriment of 
the parties involved, and at the expense of stability in the global trading system. Examples range 
from the recent Russian response to the E. Coli outbreak in Germany in the summer of 2011, to 
the draconian measures instituted by China (in addition to at least 15 other countries) to address 
the H1N1 virus in 2009, to the widespread import bans on poultry that devastated this industry in 
Asia in response to the avian influenza in 2004. It is no wonder that public anxiety is at new 
heights due to the frightening news reports on these and similar events. Policymakers have been 
scrambling to identify responses to these outbreaks that safeguard public health without 
unnecessary interference with international trade. This paper provides a framework that 
illustrates how global disease outbreaks interact with features of the domestic economy to 
generate trade policy. To add to the relatively sparse literature on this issue, the paper focuses on 
the role that the objectives of policymakers play in formulating a trade policy response, when 
faced with public health uncertainty in a trading partner. Understanding the underlying forces 
that give rise to a specific trade regime in this context is an important step toward avoiding 
undesirable health and economic outcomes. 
The threat from infectious disease is not new. However, it has taken on global dimensions 
because international trade and travel make it easy for pathogenic microbes to spread to new 
populations. For some time now, public health scholars have been studying the globalization of 
infectious disease due to international trade, and health policies that could be effective in 
protecting populations. For example, Kimball (2006) focuses on health issues resulting from 
global trade, describes different kinds of pathogens, and discusses both fast-moving and long-
incubation diseases. Much research has obviously been done in epidemiology to understand and 
analyze the spread of infectious disease in populations. Although economics has been relatively 
less involved in the conversation on the impact of infectious diseases, it has still made notable 
contributions. Roberts (2006) collects an impressive list of articles that bring an economics 
perspective to bear on the consequences of infectious disease. However, most of the economic 
epidemiology literature has centered on understanding the behavior of agents in order to design 
public health interventions (Gersovitz and Hammer, 2003). For example, Auld (2003) uses a 
dynamic model to study risky behavior during an epidemic. Chakraborty, et al. (2010) develops a 
general equilibrium model of infectious disease with a focus on prevention methods, while 
Momota, et al. (2005) and Mesnard and Seabright (2009) study the same in an overlapping-
generations framework and a two-period model respectively. Other studies include the seminal 
work by Brito, et al. (1991) and its extension by Kureishi (2009). 
  Existing approaches in economics have not considered the consequences of the 
globalization of infectious disease on international commerce. While there is recognition of the 
importance of this issue in the public health community, interest has been confined to designing 
an adequate set of health policy responses. This paper adds an economic perspective to this 
discussion. It highlights the mechanics through which trade policy is formed in an environment 
fraught with uncertainty about vulnerability to infectious disease. Understanding these 
mechanics would contribute to the development of both effective trade and public health 
policies. 
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  The paper uses a simple two-country political economy model with the policy-relevant 
country consuming a certain good which can either be produced domestically or imported from 
abroad. The government raises revenue through taxation of the local population and from tariffs 
on imports. In that sense, what the paper refers to as an open-trade policy is in fact a continuation 
of trade, even with tariffs on imports, rather than an outright import ban. An intuition-confirming 
finding of the paper is that an open trade regime is more likely—even in the face of an infectious 
disease outbreak in the exporting country—when the population in the importing country is not 
highly susceptible to the infection. The paper also finds that the likelihood of observing more 
trade openness is high when the domestic production technology is relatively inferior to its 
foreign counterpart. Interestingly, infectious disease outbreak overseas is more likely to prompt 
the importing country to block trade the more important domestic taxation is to government 
revenues. 
 
2. The Model 
 
We formulate a model with two countries, Home and Foreign. Home has consumers and a 
monopolist as two types of agents.  The measure of consumers is normalized to one. There are 
two goods in the Home economy. These are denoted by x1, which is produced competitively and 
the price of which is normalized to one, and x2, which can either be produced domestically or 
imported from Foreign at an endogenously determined price p. Home is the only market for x2. 
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Production of x2 follows the function given by: 
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where l  is a technology that turns one unit of x1 into l  units of x2. We assume that Foreign has 
a comparative advantage in manufacturing x2. Hence, the technology in Foreign (l  = M) is 
superior to the one in Home (l  = N), i.e. M > N.  
  The monopolist in Foreign also faces an ad valorem tariff, t, on its exports of x2 to Home. 
Given the constant elasticity of demand for x2 from Home, the monopolist in Foreign maximizes 
profits by using a constant markup over marginal cost. Hence, the profit-maximizing price and 
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In addition to tariff revenue, the government in Home can also raise revenue through the lump-
sum taxation of its citizens. This tax, T, can be chosen to be any amount from zero to T . This tax 
allows us to track the importance of a healthy, and therefore taxable, domestic population to the 
government. 
  Consider now a situation where Foreign has an outbreak of infectious disease that has the 
potential of being transmitted to Home by being embedded in the imported good, x2. We analyze 
the decision problem of the government in Home whose objective is to maximize its own payoff. 
This government faces the following four possibilities: 
 
1)  Keep trade open but face only low levels of infection 
2)  Keep trade open and become infected  
3)  Block imports and contain the infection at low levels  
4)  Block imports but still become infected. We assume that the infection can get in through 
other channels such as travel. The seriousness of infection when imports are blocked 
depends on how porous the other channels are. 
 
As indicated in the introduction, an open trade regime simply refers to a continuation of trade as 
opposed to a complete ban on imports. Trade with tariffs is still considered to be a policy of 
openness for the purposes of this analysis. 
Let a  denote the probability of low infection when imports are blocked. This implies a 
probability  ) 1 ( a -  of a serious infection under a blocked-imports trade regime. Similarly, let b  
denote the probability of a limited infection when trade is left open, and  ) 1 ( b -  the probability 
of a high level of infection under an open trade regime. To capture the idea that infections are 
more likely to be contained if infected goods are prevented from entering Home, we assume 
b a ³ . 
  Let 
i d , i = H, L,  be the infected proportion of the population in Home, with 
L H d d > , 
where 
H d  is the proportion of the population that is infected when the infection rate is high. We 
now determine the payoffs, Ri, i = 1,2,3,4, of the Home government under the four possibilities 
enumerated above. 
 
Case 1: Open trade regime and low levels of infection. The Home government imposes the 
maximum tax,  T T = , on its citizens. Hence, the government obtains: 
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This implies a revenue-maximizing tax rate of t = (1-a) making the optimal payoff: 
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Case 2: Open trade regime and high levels of infection. This is similar to Case 1 except that a 
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Case 3: Blocked trade and low levels of infection. In this case, the government loses its tariff 
revenue. We assume that to replace lost imports in the short term, a domestic firm produces the 
good and the government levies a tax on this firm to enhance its revenue. Another approach 
could be to model the government engaging in the import-substituting production instead. In that 
case, since the government will not tax itself, the revenue equations below will not include tax 
revenue from domestic output of x2. However, this does not affect the implications of the model. 
Proceeding with the assumption of a domestic firm producing x2 and letting  0 =
L d  as before, 
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Case 4: Blocked trade and high levels of infection. Government revenue is similar to that in Case 
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We can now use the expressions for government revenue in the four cases above to write down 
the expected returns to the government of maintaining open trade on the one hand, and shutting 
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When trade is blocked, the expected return becomes: 
 

















aN a T aN a T blocked E 1 1 ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) )( 1 ( ) ( d a a , 
 




H H aN a T blocked E - - + - + = 1 ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( d ad             (13) 
 







H H M a a T aN a T - - - + - + < - + - + 1 2 1 ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( d bd d ad , 
 
which simplifies to: 
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Here,  T
H d b a ) ( -  can be interpreted as the lost expected tax revenue because of an infected, 
and therefore unhealthy and unproductive, population under an open trade regime. The 
government also fails to capture sales revenue equal to  a
a
aN a - - 1 ) )( 1 (  from the domestic 
manufacture and sale of x2 in this case. It does, however, earn  a
a
M a a - - 1 2 ) )( 1 (  in tariff revenue. 
For sales revenue to be higher than tariff revenues, we must have N > aM, i.e., Home must have 
sufficiently better technology. This suggests that in the case where there is no danger of 
infection, i.e.,  1 = = b a , Home would pursue a policy of openness whenever the technology of 
Foreign dominates that of Home. If, on the other hand, 1 < b , i.e., Home is vulnerable to 
infection through international trade, then an open trade regime becomes less likely. 
  To sum up, openness to trade is more likely even in the face of an infectious disease 
outbreak in the trading partner when: 
a)  the prospects of the Home government earning significant revenue through sales of its 
own output are low, i.e., N is low; 
b)  the Home government is able to earn substantial revenue through tariffs on imports 
from its technologically superior Foreign competitor. In other words, M is high; 
c)  taxes raised from the local population are likely to be low, i.e., T  is low; 




International trade accounts for a significant portion of global economic activity. 
Economists and policy makers have long recognized the crucial role trade policy plays in the 
development and growth of poor nations. According to the World Trade Organization, the 
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volume of global trade, in spite of the severe global contraction of 2008-09, was still in excess of 
$12 trillion. Nearly half of this was the share of developing countries. Infectious disease outbreak 
in one part of the world threatens the stability of the whole global economy because of the often 
surprising ease and speed with which deadly pathogens now travel the globe. For example, cross-
border trade in seemingly innocuous products like used car tires has been identified as the culprit 
that disseminated mosquito vectors for dengue fever to tropical urban centers (Gubler, 1998). 
The magnitude of the problem and its potential to wreak havoc in the future can be gleaned from 
the fact that nearly a third of all deaths worldwide can be chalked up to infectious diseases. In 
2003, SARS was responsible for a worldwide loss of $50 billion through its impact on global 
commerce, and this number is likely to multiply given the increasing types and outbreak 
frequency of infectious disease. According to the National Intelligence Estimate of the United 
States, infectious diseases could reduce GDP in some Sub-Saharan African countries by as much 
as 20 percent through their adverse effects on profitability and international investment. 
Research is needed to better understand the structure and scope of these risks. This paper 
provides a simple framework to organize our thinking on trade policy generation under the kind 
of exigent circumstances described above. 
One intuitively appealing result of the paper is the tendency toward openness when the 
importing country is not highly susceptible to infection. The policy response to the avian 
influenza outbreak in 2004 appears to confirm this conclusion since import bans were mostly 
instituted by developing countries with weak public health systems while countries such as 
Canada employed a more nuanced import-inspection policy. Similarly, the Russian response to 
the E. Coli outbreak in Europe may also be viewed as an attempt to safeguard its population from 
disease, given that Russia overwhelmingly depends on food imports, especially from Germany, 
and hence has high susceptibility to infections from food sources. The result also confirms the 
value of the effort expended on identifying effective public health interventions to minimize 
vulnerability to disease and the potential success these interventions might have in maintaining 
trade openness.  
The paper also underscores the importance of domestic economic features such as 
technological inferiority of the import-competing sector, and unreliability of the domestic tax 
base as a source of government revenue, in promoting open trade policies. The Chinese response 
to the H1N1 virus in 2009 suggests that the reliance of the government on the local population 
for income is indeed a factor affecting trade policy. In the Chinese case, the factory-of-the-world 
role of the country and the dependence on a healthy population to maintain and promote growth 
might be even more critical reasons for the excessively harsh policy response to public health 
risks from infectious disease. Reduced domestic investment in import-competing production 
technologies and less dependence on the domestic population as a source of government revenue 
are therefore likely to be successful in minimizing disturbances to the global trading system due 
to infectious disease outbreak. 
  As discussed earlier, economic epidemiology has been mostly limited to understanding 
the effects of public health interventions to address infectious disease spread (Philipson, 2000), 
perhaps because of its focus on the domestic economy. Open economy models that incorporate 
specific disease dynamics are needed to identify both effective trade and health policy responses 
to the varied courses different diseases take over time. Klein, et al. (2007) present many useful 
ideas to fuse the economic and epidemiological approaches with an eye toward improving the 
quality of infectious disease models. Although their main concern is with disease policy inside 
closed economies, many of their ideas can be gainfully adapted into open economy frameworks. 
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For example, they correctly point out the need to be attentive to the unique features of different 
diseases that govern disease epidemiology. This insight is incorporated into a model by 
Gersovitz and Hammer (2004), with the objective to specify optimal interventions for public 
health. Future research needs to combine these insights with open economy models to determine 
effective health as well as trade policies by taking into account the epidemiology unique to the 
various types of infectious diseases. Policy responses that are tailored to address specific disease 
outbreaks are most likely to be effective in safeguarding public health without unnecessary 
disruptions to the global trading system. 
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